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Abstract
Context: Software quality is a complex concept. Therefore, assessing and
predicting it is still challenging in practice as well as in research. Activity-
based quality models break down this complex concept into concrete defi-
nitions, more precisely facts about the system, process, and environment as
well as their impact on activities performed on and with the system. How-
ever, these models lack an operationalisation that would allow them to be
used in assessment and prediction of quality. Bayesian networks have been
shown to be a viable means for this task incorporating variables with uncer-
tainty. Objective: The qualitative knowledge contained in activity-based
quality models are an abundant basis for building Bayesian networks for
quality assessment. This paper describes a four-step approach for deriv-
ing systematically a Bayesian network from a assessment goal and a quality
model. Method: The four steps of the approach are explained in detail
and with running examples. Furthermore, an initial evaluation is performed,
in which data from NASA projects and an open source system is obtained.
The approach is applied to this data and its applicability is analysed. Re-
sults: The approach is applicable to the data from the NASA projects and
the open source system. However, the predictive results vary depending on
the availability and quality of the data, especially the underlying general dis-
tributions. Conclusion: The approach is viable in a realistic context but
needs further investigation in case studies in order to analyse its predictive
validity.
Key words: Activity-Based Quality Model, Bayesian Network, Quality
Assessment, Quality Prediction
Preprint submitted to Information and Software Technology December 1, 2016
ar
X
iv
:1
61
1.
10
18
1v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  3
0 N
ov
 20
16
1. Introduction
Despite the importance of software quality, its management is still an
immature discipline in software engineering research and practice. Research
work has gone in many directions and produced a variety of useful results.
However, there is still no commonly agreed way for quality management.
The practice varies strongly from a concentration on testing to a large-scale
quality management process.
One main problem is that many of the tools and methods in quality as-
surance and management work isolated. For example, development teams
usually perform peer reviews whose results are often not set into relation
to results of integration or system tests performed by the quality assurance
team. Hence, quality is tackled on many levels without a combined strat-
egy [1]. What is missing is a clear integration of these single efforts. One
prerequisite for such an integration is a quality management sub-process in
the overall development process. The process defines the roles, activities,
and artefacts and how they work together. Hence, the maturity level of the
organisation’s processes plays an important role. A second prerequisite is a
clear quality model that specifies the quality of the software to be developed.
1.1. Problem
Current quality models such as the ISO 9126 [2] have widely acknowledged
problems [3, 4, 5]. Especially as a basis for assessment and prediction, the
defined “-ilities” are too abstract. A clear transition to measurements is
therefore difficult in practice. Hence, quantitative quality assessment and
prediction is usually done without direct use of such a quality model. This,
in turn, leads to isolated solutions in quality management.
1.2. Contribution
We use the previously proposed activity-based quality models (ABQM) [4]
as a basis for quality assessment and prediction. They provide a clear struc-
ture of quality and detailed information about quality-influences. Activity-
based quality models have proven useful in practice to structure quality and
to generate corresponding guidelines and checklists. In this paper, we add a
systematic transition from ABQMs to Bayesian networks in order to enhance
their assessment and prediction capabilities. A four-step approach is defined
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that generates a Bayesian network using an activity-based quality model and
an assessment or prediction goal. The approach is demonstrated in several
examples.
1.3. Outline
We first motivate and introduce activity-based quality models in Section
2. In Section 3 the four-step approach for systematically constructing a
Bayesian network from an activity-based quality model is proposed. The
approach is then demonstrated in an initial evaluation in Section 4 using
publicly available data from NASA projects and measured data from the
open source system Tomcat. Related work is discussed in Section 5 and final
conclusions are given in Section 6.
2. Activity-Based Quality Models
Quality models describe in a structured way the meaning of a software’s
quality. We introduce the use of general quality models and how the mod-
elling of activities and facts helps to define quality more precisely.
2.1. Software Quality Models
Not only the functionality but also the quality of a software system needs
to be specified in order to control it. A quality model describes what is meant
by quality and refines this concept in a structured way. In practice, this is
often merely a metric such as number of defects or high-level descriptions as
given by the ISO 9126 [2].
In general, there are two main uses of quality models in a software project:
• As a basis for defining quality requirements
• For assigning quality assurance techniques and measurements to quality
requirements
For the first use, requirements engineers commonly constrain well-known
quality attributes (reliability, maintainability, etc.) as defined in a quality
model. In practice, they often reduce this to simple statements such as “The
system shall be easily maintainable.” The second use is often not explic-
itly considered. However, quality engineers nearly always measure certain
metrics such as the number of faults in the system detected by inspections
and testing. The relationship between these measures and quality attributes
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remains unclear. The reason lies in the lack of practical means to define met-
rics for these high-level quality attributes. Hence, quality models need more
structure and detail to integrate them closely in the development process.
2.2. Facts and Activities
We proposed to use activity-based quality models [4] in order to address
the shortcomings of existing quality models. The idea is to avoid to use
high-level “-ilities” for defining quality and instead to break it down into
detailed facts and their influence on activities performed on and with the
system. In addition to information about the characteristics of a system,
the model contains further important facts about the process, the team and
the environment and their respective influence on, for example, maintenance
activities such as Code Reading, Modification, or Test. For example, redundant
methods in the source code, also called clones, exhibit a negative influence on
modifications of the system, because changes to clones have to be performed
in several places in the source code. Concrete models have been built for
maintainability [4], usability [6], and security [7].
For ABQMs, an explicit meta-model (also called structure model) was
defined in order to characterise the quality model elements and their re-
lationships. Four elements of the meta-model are most important: Entity,
ATTRIBUTE, Impact and Activity. An Entity can be any thing, animate or inan-
imate, that can have an influence on software quality, e.g., the source code
of a method or the involved testers. These entities are characterised by at-
tributes such as STRUCTUREDNESS or CONFORMITY. The combination of an entity
and an attribute is called a fact. We use the notation [Entity | ATTRIBUTE] for a
fact. For the example of code clones, we write [Method | REDUNDANCY] to denote
methods that are redundant. These facts are assessable either by automatic
measurement or by manual review. If possible, we define applicable measures
for the facts inside the ABQM.
An influence of a fact is specified by an Impact. We concentrate on the
influences on activities, i.e., anything that is done with the system. For ex-
ample, Maintenance or Use are high-level activities. The impact on an Activity
can be positive or negative. An activity might have an influence on a fact
that also has an impact on it. These cyclic situations are not considered in
the meta-model.
We complete the code clone example by adding the impact on Modification:
[Method | REDUNDANCY] −−→ [Modification]. This means that if a system entity
Method exhibits the attribute REDUNDANCY it will have a negative impact on
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the Modification activity, i.e., changing the method. A further example is the
following tuple that describes consistent identifiers: [Identifier | CONSISTENCY]
+−→ [Modification]. Its meaning is that identifiers that can be shown to be
consistent have a positive influence on the modification activity of the main-
tainer of the system. In the model itself, we document more information
such as textual descriptions, sources, and assessment descriptions. However,
the short notation captures the essential relationships.
The model does not only contain the impacts of facts on activities but
also the relationships among these. Facts as well as activities are organised
in hierarchies. A top-level activity Activity has sub-activities such as Use,
Maintenance, or Administration. These examples are depicted in Figure 1. In
realistic quality models they are further refined. For example, maintenance
can have sub-activities such as Code Reading and Modification. These activities
can be derived from existing standards (e.g., [8]) or the activities defined in
process models.
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Figure 1: High-level view on an activity-based quality model as a matrix
Because facts are a composite of an entity and an attribute, the organ-
isation in a hierarchy is straightforward. Hierarchical relationships between
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entities do usually already exist. The top-level in Figure 1 is the Situation
of the software development project, which denotes the root for all entities
of the system as well as entities from its environment. In the example, it
contains the System, the system’s Environment and the development Organi-
sation. Again, these entities need to be further refined. For example, the
system could consist of the source code as well as the executable. All of
these entities can be described with attributes, e.g., the STRUCTUREDNESS of
the System. In principle, there could be more complex relationships instead
of hierarchies, but modelling and finding information tends to be easier if
such complex relationships are mapped to hierarchies.
The two hierarchies, the fact tree and the activity tree, together with the
impacts of the facts on the activities can then be visualised using a matrix
as in Figure 1. The fact tree is shown on the left, the activity tree on the
top. The impacts are depicted by entries in the matrix where a “+” denotes
a positive and a “–” a negative impact.
The associations between facts in the fact tree can have two different
meanings. Either an entity is a part or a kind of its super-entity. Along
the inheritance associations, parts and attributes are inherited. Hence, it
allows a more compact description and prevents omissions in the model. For
example, naming conventions are valid for all identifiers no matter whether
they are class names, file names, or variable names.
Having defined all these entries in the ABQM, we can specify which activ-
ities we want to support and which influencing facts need to be analysed. In
terms of the above example, if we want to support the activity Modification,
we know that we need to inspect the identifiers for their consistency.
Another way of looking at ABQMs is as GQM patterns [9, 10]. The
activity defines the goal and the facts are questions for that goal that are
measured by certain metrics in a defined assessment. In the example, the goal
is to evaluate the modification activity that is analysed by asking the question
“How consistent are the identifiers?”, which is asked in an assessment.
There exists a prototype tool to define this kind of large and detailed qual-
ity models [4]. Besides the easier creation and modification of the model, this
has also the advantage that we can automate certain quality assurance tasks.
For example, by using the tool we can automatically generate customised re-
view guidelines for specific views.
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3. Assessment and Prediction Approach
Although activity-based quality models have proven to be useful in prac-
tice, there is no systematic measurement approach for them. Hence, there
are no quantitative assessments and predictions possible so far. We propose
an approach that can be used for systematically deriving assessment and
prediction models from an activity-based quality model.
3.1. Aim and Basic Idea
The general aim of the approach is to provide quality managers with a
systematic method to derive assessments and predictions from an activity-
based quality model. In the ABQM, there are definitions of what quality
means with respect to different situations, artefacts, and considered activ-
ities. At present, we give a textual description in the quality model that
specifies how a fact could be assessed. For example, the fact described by
[Method | REDUNDANCY] contains the following assessment description: “This
fact can be assessed manually or semi-automatically. For the automatic as-
sessments there are tools such as ConQAT or CCFinder to detect redundant
parts of the source code.” This information is useful for quality assurance
planning but cannot directly be used for an overall assessment, let alone
prediction.
Moreover, as the basic principle of activity-based quality models is that
the most important question in quality is how well activities can be per-
formed on and with the system, not only facts but also activities should be
assessed and predicted from the knowledge of facts and impacts. At present,
activity-based quality models only make the qualitative statement whether
an impact is positive or negative. This is suitable for rough assessments
only. More comprehensive and precise assessments of the current state and
prediction of future states need a more sophisticated approach. It has to
systematically help using the given relationships and enriching them with
quantitative information. In terms of measurement scales, we move from an
ordinal scale to an interval scale or higher.
As most facts and especially the relationships between facts and activities
have an associated uncertainty, statistical methods are necessary. The two
major reasons are
1. that we cannot determine the exact relationship but can derive an
uncertain range and
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2. measured values can be uncertain, e.g., values from expert opinion.
Moreover, the statistical method needs to be able to directly model the de-
pendencies of different factors from the quality model. We identified Bayesian
networks as most suitable for that task.
3.2. Bayesian Networks
Bayesian networks, also known as Bayesian belief nets or belief networks,
are a modelling technique for causal relationship based on Bayesian inference.
They are represented as a directed acyclic graph with nodes for uncertain
variables and edges for directed relationships between the variables. This
graph models all the relationships abstractly. A hypothetical example with
the 3 variables Code Complexity, Testing Effort, and Number of Field Failures
is given in Figure 2. The code complexity influences the testing effort and
the number of field failures of a software. The testing effort also impacts the
number of failures.
Probability
 of Failure
      Code
Complexity
Testing
  Eort
Figure 2: A simple example Bayesian network
For each node or variable there is a corresponding node probability table
(NPT). These tables define the relationships and the uncertainty of these
variables. The variables are usually discrete with a fixed number of states.
For each state, it gives the probability that the variable is in this state. If
there are parent nodes, i.e., a node that influences the current node, it defines
these probabilities in dependence on the states of the parents. An example
for the variable Number of Field Failures is shown in Table 1. It specifies all
combinations, e.g., that the Number of Field Failures is with a probability of
60% in the state “> 100” if both parents are in the state low, and with 40%
in “> 100” if the testing effort is high and the code complexity is low.
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Table 1: An example NPT for the variable Number of Field Failures with two states and
two parents
Testing Effort low high
Code Complexity low med high low med high
< 100 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.55 0.5
> 100 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.45 0.5
The process of building a Bayesian network contains the identification
of important variables that shall be modelled, representing them as nodes,
constructing the topology and specifying the NPTs. Each of these steps
is important and non-trivial. First, the identification of important variables
includes the assumption that the model builder can decide on some basis what
is important. In many cases, this is not clear beforehand. One possibility is
to include many variables and use sensitivity analysis to remove insignificant
ones. A model of the complete situation is usually not feasible, because the
network becomes too complex, very elaborate to build, and most often there
is no knowledge available about several variables.
Second, the creation of the topology utilises the assumption that the
model builder can decide on the dependence and independence of the identi-
fied variables. In the process of building the Bayesian network, especially for
independence assumptions (i.e., missing edges in the graph), detailed justifi-
cations should be given. Third, the problem of constructing NPTs is widely
acknowledged in the literature [11]. A major part of this problem is that
it involves defining quantitative relationships between variables. There are
various possible methods for this quantification such as a probability wheel
or regression from empirically collected data. All methods have their pros
and cons.
It is important to note that each of these steps is important and errors
in each of these steps can have a large effect on the outcome. Bayesian
networks and the corresponding tool support make it easy to build models
and get quantitative results. However, one needs to be aware that many
assumptions are embedded in a Bayesian network that need to be validated
before it can be trusted.
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3.3. Four Steps for Network Building
We propose a four-step approach for building a Bayesian network as as-
sessment and prediction model derived systematically from an activity-based
quality model. The resulting Bayesian network contains three types of nodes:
• Activity nodes that represent activities from the quality model
• Fact nodes that represent facts from the quality model
• Indicator nodes that represent metrics for activities or facts
We need four steps to derive these nodes from the information of the ABQM.
First, we identify the relevant activities with indicators based on the assess-
ment or prediction goal. Second, influences by sub-activities and facts are
identified. This step is repeated recursively for sub-activities. The resulting
facts together with their impacts are modelled. Third, suitable indicators for
the facts are added. Fourth, the node probability tables (NPT) are defined
to reflect the quantitative relationships. Having that, the Bayesian network
can be used for simulation by setting values for any of the nodes. However,
we first describe the four steps in more detail.
Step 1. The first step is a goal-based derivation of relevant activities and their
indicators. We use GQM [9] to structure that derivation. We first define the
assessment or prediction goal, for example, optimal maintenance planning
or optimisation of security assurance. The identification and resolution of
conflicting goals is out of scope of this method. The goal leads to relevant
activities, such as maintenance or attack. This is refined by stating questions
that need to be answered to reach that goal. For example, how high will
be the maintenance effort over the next year or how often will there be a
successful attack in the next year? Finally, we derive metrics or indicators
that allow a measurement to answer the question. In the examples, it can
be the average change effort or the number of harmful attacks over the next
year.
Step 2. In the second step, we use the quality model to identify the other
factors that are related to the identified activities. There are two possibilities:
1. There are sub-activities of the identified activities.
2. There are impacts from facts to the identified activities.
10
We repeat this recursively for the sub-activities until all facts are collected
that have an impact on the activities sub-tree below the identified activity.
For each activity we immediately see the impacts and hence the correspond-
ing facts. All activities and facts identified this way are modelled as nodes in
the Bayesian network. We add edges from sub-activities to super-activities
and from facts to activities on which they have an impact. Figure 3 gives an
abstract overview of that mapping from the quality model to the Bayesian
network.
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Figure 3: Mapping of quality model elements to Bayesian network elements. The dashed
arrows indicate examples for mappings.
Step 3. In the third step, we add additional nodes as indicators for each fact
and activity node that we want a measurement for. In the first step, we
defined the indicator for our relevant activity. Hence, we can add additional
indicators for sub-activities if needed. In any case, there need to be at least
one indicator for each fact that is modelled. There might be a precise de-
scription in the quality model already. Otherwise, we need to derive our own
metric or use an existing one from the literature. The indicator does not
have to be measured automatically, but manual reviews can also be included
in the assessment. The edges are directed from the activity and fact nodes to
the indicators, i.e., the indicators are dependent on the facts and activities
as an indicator is only an expression of the underlying factor it describes.
A main advantage of using an ABQM as a basis for the Bayesian network
is that it prescribes its topology. One of the prime points of such quality
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models is to qualitatively describe the relationships between different factors
that are relevant for software quality. We rely on that and assume that all
dependencies have been modelled and that all other factors are independent.
On the one hand, this constrains the validity of the results of the Bayesian
network by the validity of the ABQM. On the other hand, it frees the network
builder from reasoning about independence and dependence.
Step 4. Finally, the fourth step enriches the Bayesian network with quanti-
tative information. This includes defining node states as well as filling the
NPT for each node. The activity and fact nodes are usually modelled as
ranked nodes, i.e., in an ordinal scale. The most common example is the
scale containing low, medium, and high. This has advantages in evaluation
and aggregation. The evaluation is easier as not precise numbers have to
be determined but coarse-grained levels. These levels actually reflect much
more the high uncertainty in the data. In aggregating over nodes (up the
hierarchy in the activity tree) coarse-grained ranked data is also more simple
to handle. It is easier to define an aggregation specification for only a few
levels in an ordinal scale than for continuous data.
To define the NPT, we use an approach proposed by Fenton, Neil and
Galan Caballero [12]. The basic idea is to formalise the behaviour observed
with experts that have to estimate NPTs. They usually estimate the central
tendency or some extreme values based on the influencing nodes. The re-
maining cells of the table are then filled accordingly. This is similar to linear
regression where a Normal distribution is used to model the uncertainty. We
use the doubly truncated Normal distribution (TNormal) that is only defined
in the [0, 1] region. It allows to model a variety of shapes depending on the
mean and variation. For example, it renders it possible to model the NPT
of a node by a weighted mean over the influencing nodes.
The node states of indicator nodes depend on the scale of the indicator
used. This often will be continuous or discrete interval states such as lines
of codes in intervals of a hundred or a thousand. The NPTs of the indicator
nodes are then defined using either common industry distributions or in-
formation from company-internal measurements. For example, typical LOC
distributions can be accumulated over time. The influence of the activity or
fact node it belongs to can be modelled in at least two ways:
• partitioned expressions
• arithmetic expressions
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The latter describes a direct arithmetical relationship from the level in
the activity or fact node to the indicator. Using a partitioned expression, the
additional uncertainty can be expressed by defining probability distributions
for each level of the node.
3.4. Usage of the Bayesian Network
A major feature of Bayesian networks is their capability to simulate dif-
ferent scenarios. Having built the Bayesian network based on the ABQM,
we can ask “what if?” questions. These questions are formulated in sce-
narios that can be simulated and compared. A scenario involves adding
additional information to the model, more specifically, adding an observa-
tion for a node. This way, the uncertainty is removed and the consequences
for the other nodes can be calculated. In a Bayesian network it is possible
to do forward as well as backward inference, i.e., information can be added
to any node and the effect is calculated in any direction of the graph.
A first straightforward scenario is to add the currently measured values
for the fact indicator nodes. This will drive the calculation up to the activities
and the activity indicator node. The activity indicator node then shows the
probability distribution for its value, i.e., the value of the activity. Afterwards
changes can be made to the fact indicator nodes in other scenarios to reflect
possible changes and their effect on the activity can be predicted. A further
interesting scenario is to set a desired value for the activity indicator and let
the network calculate the most probable explanation in the fact indicators.
It provides the values that should be reached in order to fulfil the goal.
4. Initial Evaluation
The approach presented above can be used in various contexts to answer
assessment and prediction questions. In this section, we provide an initial
evaluation by applying the approach to several publicly available data sets
as well as automatically collectable measures for an open source system.
4.1. Goal
We provide an exemplary application of the approach based on a small
extract of our quality model for maintainability for which there is public data
available, and on our model for security for which we collect measures from
an open source system. The examples demonstrate the basic principles of the
approach on real data sets. This way, we analyse whether the approach is
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feasible in an almost realistic setting. The predictive validity in the examples
can give an indication of the usefulness of the approach, because we expect
an improvement over industry average values at least.
At present, we cannot provide a complete validation of the assessment and
prediction approach because this would involve measuring a large number
of facts from the quality model in order to take full advantage from the
knowledge contained in it. This data is not available in public data sets.
Measuring this at a company will need time and effort. Only then a sensible
analysis of the predictive validity and comparisons with other prediction
models are possible.
4.2. Maintainability Cases
The first part of the examples deals with the analysis of maintainability.
We follow the IEEE and define maintainability as follows: “The ease with
which a software system or component can be modified to correct faults, im-
prove performance or other attributes, or adapt to a changed environment.”
[13]
4.2.1. Context
The 4 systems under analysis for maintainability were developed by NASA
in the projects CM1, KC1, KC3, and KC4 for which the data has been pub-
licised [14]. The characteristics of these projects are summarised in Table 2.
Various metrics, including the McCabe and Halstead metrics, have been col-
lected in these projects. The projects were selected for this analysis because
their data is openly available and effort data per defect was collected. Hence,
the selection criterion was opportunistic. Nevertheless, the diversity of sizes,
functionality, and programming language in the set of analysed systems is
sufficient to generalise the experiences to other systems.
Table 2: Characteristics of the projects used in the maintainability cases
Project Size (LOC) Lang. Function
CM1 16,903 C Space craft instrument
KC1 42,963 C++ Ground system
KC3 7,749 Java Satellite data processing
KC4 25,436 Perl Subscription server
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As the quality model, we use the activity-based quality model for main-
tainability from [4]. It contains a complete activity tree for maintenance as
well as about 200 facts with an impact on those activities. The NASA data
sets do not contain data for all of these facts; hence, we select a small set of
facts and corresponding activities to predict maintainability. The choice was
therefore guided by the availability of the data. The actual maintainability
can be judged for these projects, because the effort for several changes has
been documented. We will use this as our surrogate measure.
For modelling the Bayesian network, we use the tool AgenaRisk1. It
provides a complete tool environment for Bayesian networks including the
usage of expressions for describing the NPT and sensitivity analysis.
4.2.2. Procedure
The first step in our assessment and prediction approach is to identify
the relevant activities and corresponding indicators (metrics) in a GQM-like
procedure. We want to analyse maintainability and we assume that the
quality manager is interested in the question of how high the maintenance
efforts will be on average in the future. This information helps in planning
the maintenance team. Hence, we formulate the goal as “Planning of fu-
ture maintenance efforts”. We can directly identify the activity Maintenance
in that goal. To further operationalise that, we define the corresponding
question as “What will be the maintenance effort per change request?”.
This information, together with a prediction of the yearly number of change
requests, would give a good basis for maintenance planning. However, we
concentrate only on the question about the effort per change request. This
leads us straightforwardly to the metric “average effort per change request”.
In the second step, we start building the Bayesian network. We look at
the maintainability model and find no direct impacts on Maintenance that
should be considered here. However, we find 10 sub-activities including the
following 3 that we analyse further: Quality Assurance, Implementation and Anal-
ysis. All three have impacts from facts but having in mind the available data,
we ignore these and use the further sub-activities Testing, Modification and
Comprehension with its child Code Reading. We create nodes for these activi-
ties and connect them with edges corresponding to their hierarchy. They can
be seen in Figure 4 in the box “Activities”.
1http://www.agenarisk.com/
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Figure 4: The topology of the Bayesian network for the maintainability cases
We only include 3 impacts on each of the lowest level activities chosen so
far because we can find corresponding data in the NASA data sets. These
facts together with their impacts are:
• [Module | EXTENT] −−→ [Code Reading]
The size of a module has an impact on reading the code of the module.
In essence, the larger the module, the longer it takes to read it.
• [Implementation | REGULARITY] +−→ [Testing]
An implementation is regular if it does not use unnecessarily nested
branches. This complex structure would render coverage by tests more
difficult.
• [Comment | APPROPRIATENESS] +−→ [Modification]
Comments need to appropriately describe the code it is associated with.
We add these facts as nodes in the Bayesian network into the box “Facts”
in Figure 4. The impacts are included as the arrows from the facts to the
activities. There are further impacts conceivable, but we restrain them to
the impacts available in the used maintainability model [4].
The indicators that are identified in the fourth step of the approach are
taken from the available data of the data set. We only use one indicator per
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fact although we are aware that each fact has more aspects that should be
covered. For the Extent of Modules, we use the indicator Average module
size given in LOC. The Regularity of the Implementation is indicated by the
Average Cyclomatic Complexity. This is not a particularly good indicator as
it only gives a number for the decision points in the implementation. In con-
trast, a manual review could far better decide whether the implementation
is regular. However, we have no access to review results. A similar reasoning
holds for the indicator Comment Ratio for the fact Appropriateness of Com-
ments. The proportion of the comments in relation to the other code is only
of minor importance in comparison with the semantic appropriateness. How-
ever, we do not have access to such a semantic judgement. The indicators
can be found in Figure 4 on the right-hand side in the box “Indicators”.
A difficult problem in general with Bayesian networks is the definition of
the node probability tables (NPT) [11]. Network builders can use various
methods to define these NPTs, which we do not describe here in detail. For
the approach, we can simplify the problem to 2 cases:
• Activity and fact NPTs
• Indicator NPTs
The NPTs for the activities and facts can be assumed as uniformly dis-
tributed unless there is additional knowledge. The impacts are only modelled
as direct influence. Here, a special method for ranked nodes [12] can be ap-
plied that simplifies the task. For example, the node Maintenance is modelled
by the following distribution as its NPT:
TNormal
[
Analysis + Quality Assurance + Implementation
3
,
1
3
, 0.001
]
(1)
The values of the three nodes Analysis, Quality Assurance, and Implemen-
tation are averaged with the implicit weight 1 each. The 1/3 gives the nor-
malisation and 0.001 is the variance.
For the indicator NPTs either empirically investigated distributions of
the company or industry average distribution should be used. This forms
the distribution of the indicator values under uncertainty without any ob-
servations. The indicator node Comment Ratio is shown as an example in
Table 3. It gives the NPT as an partitioned expression depending on the
state of the parent node Appropriateness of Comments.
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Table 3: NPT of the indicator node Comment Ratio
Appropriateness of Comments Expressions
Low TNormal[0.01,1,0.03]
Medium TNormal[0.1,1,0.05]
High TNormal[0.25,1,0.1]
For the average effort of a change, we refer to [15] that gave a mean
defect removal cost of 27.4 person-hours with minimum 3.9 and maximum
66.6. Although a change does not always have to be a defect removal, it is
precise enough for the initial evaluation. For the distributions of the other
indicators, no published distributions were available. Hence, our own expert
opinion was used as a basis.
4.2.3. Results and Discussion
Figure 5 shows a screenshot from AgenaRisk as an example. The light-
grey values describe the general scenario in which no observations have been
made. The dark-grey values are for the KC1 scenario in which for the three
fact indicators the real measured values are set as observations. Table 4 sum-
marises the used observation data and the results from the Bayesian network
for all 4 maintainability cases. It shows the observed values for the com-
ment ratio, the average cyclomatic complexity, and the average module size
in LOC. These were fixed in their corresponding scenarios. This has effects
on the rating of the facts and in turn on the activities. The most interesting
value, however, is the average change effort. In the general scenario, this
variable has a mean value of 27 with a standard deviation of 12.1. The table
gives the predicted average change effort in person hours together with the
standard deviation as well as the actually observed average change effort.
The 4 cases show 3 different types of results. For KC1 and KC3, the
predictions are very close to the observed values with a difference of 2.3
and 5.6 person-hours per change, respectively. For both predictions, the
observed values are well inside the standard deviation. Hence, in these cases,
the predictions are reasonably accurate.
For CM1, the additional information about the measured values shifts the
distribution to the left. The mean decreases to 15.9 with a standard deviation
of 8.5. This is a deviation of 9.9 from the observed value. However, it is
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Figure 5: The Bayesian network for KC1 in AgenaRisk. The standard scenario is shown
in light grey, the KC1 scenario in dark grey.
much closer than the industry standard of 27. Hence, it is an improvement
in comparison to just using standard numbers.
In the case of KC4, the industry standard 27 [15] would have been closer
than the prediction of 36.1 which constitutes a difference of 24 from the actual
value. This is not even inside the standard deviation. The prediction is far
too pessimistic. The reason for the large difference between the prediction
and the real value can be three-fold. First, the effort distribution from [15]
might not be appropriate for the NASA environment. Second, it might also
be the case that the data in the NASA data sets do not use exactly the
same measures as in [15]. The degree to which additional efforts for re-
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Table 4: Observations and results for the maintainability cases
CM1 KC1 KC3 KC4
Comment ratio 0.25 0.02 0.08 0.00
Avg. cyclomatic complexity 5.18 2.84 3.45 10.05
Avg. module size 33.47 20.39 16.92 203.49
Predicted avg. change effort 15.9 19.4 19.2 36.1
Standard deviation 8.5 9.8 9.8 12.1
Observed avg. change effort 6.0 21.7 24.8 12.1
inspection and re-testing are included could vary. Third, several more factors
than the 3 considered might have an influence on the maintenance effort.
The quality model contains many explanations in terms of facts that should
be investigated. Especially for KC4, there are probably other factors that
decrease the change effort in such a way. For example, the capabilities of
the developers are known to have a large effect on development productivity
[16]. However, we cannot include this as a fact in this case, because we have
no data available.
4.3. Security Case
The second part of the examples looks at security. We use the following
definition of Avizienis et al.: “Security is a composite of the attributes of con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability, requiring the concurrent existence of
1) availability for authorized actions only, 2) confidentiality, and 3) integrity
with ‘improper’ meaning ‘unauthorized.’” [17]
4.3.1. Context
The servlet container Tomcat2 is the reference implementation of the
Java servlet and JSP specification by the Apache Software Foundation. Its
main goal is to deliver HTTP responses dynamically assembled based on an
HTTP request. For this, Tomcat is one of the most used systems in the
world. We employ version 6.0 of Tomcat, which implements the Java servlet
specification 2.5 and the JSP specification 2.1. The initial version 6.0.0 was
released in December 2006. The current version 6.0.20 dates from May 2009.
2http://tomcat.apache.org/
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It consists of over 300 KLOC of Java code and it is in real production on
many sites.
A software application with such a fundamental role in Java web ap-
plications has special responsibilities in the management of vulnerabilities.
Therefore, the Apache foundation openly publishes the identified vulnera-
bilities. They can be found on the Tomcat website3. This published list of
vulnerabilities together with the availability of the source code for further
analyses is the reason for selecting Tomcat for this example. Hence, the
selection criterion was again opportunistic.
The ABQM used for the security case is the security model as described
in [7]. This model uses a well-known hierarchy of attacks as activities and
a collection of open security guidelines as facts. As modelling tool for the
Bayesian network, we employ again AgenaRisk.
4.3.2. Procedure
We start with the first step of our assessment and prediction approach
and identify the relevant activities and corresponding indicators. We analyse
security, in particular the risk of vulnerabilities in the system. The risk can be
the basis for deciding whether further security improvements need to be em-
ployed. Therefore, the goal is “Planning of further security improvements”.
For security improvements, attacks on the system need to be confounded.
Hence, the activity Attack need to be analysed. For the operationalisation,
we define the question “How many vulnerabilities are there in relation to
the software size?”. For the security improvement planning, it is not only
important how many vulnerabilities there are but also whether this number
is in a reasonable relation to the system size. It might be economically inad-
visable to invest in removing all vulnerabilities. The corresponding metric
vulnerability density that measures the number of vulnerabilities by source
code size in KSLOC can be directly derived from the question.
In the second step of the prediction and assessment approach, we build
the Bayesian network (see Figure 6). In the ABQM for security, there is the
top-level activity Attack that we measure by the above derived vulnerability
density. There are no direct impacts on this activity. Therefore, we break
it down to Abuse of Functionality, Injection, and Resource Manipulation. The
former is further refined into Functionality Misuse, the second into Format String
3http://tomcat.apache.org/security-6.html
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Injection and Embedding Scripts in Non-Script Elements, the latter into Variable
Manipulation. In the Bayesian network, nodes are created for these activities
w.r.t. the given hierarchy.
We can include 8 impacts on these activities. The impacts are chosen
so that their corresponding facts can be automatically measured by a bug
pattern tool. We chose the open source tool FindBugs4, because it is widely
used and well evaluated. The facts used together with their impacts are:
• [Object | IMMUTABILITY] −−→ [Variable Manipulation]
When objects are not immutable the caller can change the contents
of these objects which may have security implications. Hence, objects
should be immutable if possible.
• [Field | LOCALITY] −−→ [Variable Manipulation]
A mutable static field could be changed by malicious code or by accident
from another package. The field could be made package protected
and/or made final to avoid this vulnerability.
• [Field | IMMUTABILITY] −−→ [Variable Manipulation]
When a static field is mutable or references mutable objects, these could
be changed by malicious code.
• [Finalizer | LOCALITY] −−→ [Functionality Misuse]
Malicious code could call the method finalize if it is not declared pro-
tected while the object is still used and external resources could be
closed too early.
• [Cookie | SANITATION] −−→ [Format String Injection]
If a web product does not properly protect assumed-immutable values
from cookies, this can lead to modification of critical data.
• [Dynamic Web Page | SANITATION] −−→ [Embedding Script in HTTP Headers]
[Dynamic Web Page | SANITATION] −−→ [Embedding Scripts in HTTP Query
Strings]
[Dynamic Web Page | SANITATION] −−→ [XSS in Error Pages]
If a web application does not sufficiently sanitise the data it is using
in output, arbitrary content, including scripts, can be included by at-
tackers.
4http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/
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In the fourth step of the approach, indicators are defined for all 8 impacts.
The indicators in this case are all derived from FindBugs bug patterns that
are summed if they only measure different aspects of the same fact and set
into relation to the size of the system. Hence, we end up with a set of
densities of detected bug pattern. Table 5 gives the used facts together with
their associated bug patterns and the corresponding name of the density of
the sum of the findings for these patterns. The final topology of the Bayesian
net is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: The topology of the Bayesian network for the security case
There is little quantitative data published on vulnerabilities. Therefore,
we use the data on vulnerability densities from Alhazmi, Malaiya, and Ray
[18] who analysed several releases of Microsoft Windows and Red Hat Linux.
On average, these systems had a known vulnerability density of 0.0054 with
a minimum of 0.0022 and a maximum of 0.0112 vulnerabilities per KSLOC.
There is no data available about what are average densities or even occur-
rences of specific bug patterns in software systems. Hence, we make the
coarse assumption that we consider a density of 0.4 as normal for all defined
indicators for the facts. That means that 4 occurrences of each of these bug
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Table 5: The mapping of facts to FindBugs patterns and metrics
Fact FindBugs Pattern Metric
[Object | IMMUTABILITY] • May expose internal representa-
tion by returning reference to mu-
table object
• May expose internal representa-
tion by incorporating reference to
mutable object
OJI
[Field | LOCALITY] • Field isn’t final and can’t be pro-
tected from malicious code
• Field should be moved out of an
interface and made package pro-
tected
• Field should be package pro-
tected
• Field isn’t final but should be
FDL
[Field | IMMUTABILITY] • May expose internal static state
by storing a mutable object into
a static field
• Field is a mutable array
• Field is a mutable Hashtable
FDI
[Finalizer | LOCALITY] Finalizer should be protected, not pub-
lic
FZL
[Cookie | SANITATION] HTTP cookie formed from untrusted
input
COS
[Dyn. Web Page | SANITATION] Servlet reflected cross site scripting vul-
nerability
DWS
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patterns in 10 KSLOC is normal. We employed an exponential distribution
as we assume that there is a high concentration in the lower areas of the
distribution that decreases quickly in the higher areas.
4.3.3. Results and Discussion
Using the analysis tool ConQAT [19], we found that the whole Tomcat
6.0.0 source distribution contains 306,675 LOC of Java code, which corre-
spond to 151,509 SLOC in 1030 files. This is the size baseline for all the
following densities. The total number of published vulnerabilities of Tom-
cat is 24. However, we only consider the vulnerabilities rated as important
and moderate because we assume that in other systems other vulnerabilities
would not be counted as such. With this assumption the number is reduced
to 11.
Table 6 contains the summarised results. First, the 6 indicators are given.
These densities range from 0 to 1.14 occurrences per KSLOC. In the Bayesian
network, this led to the prediction of 0.006 vulnerabilities per KSLOC with
a standard deviation of 0.003. Actually observed in Tomcat over all 6.0
versions, we found a vulnerability density of 0.07 vulnerabilities per KSLOC.
Table 6: Observations and results for the security case. All densities are given in occur-
rences per KSLOC.
OJI density 1.14
FDL density 1.63
FDI density 0.06
FZL density 0.03
COS density 0.00
DWS density 0.00
Predicted vulnerability density 0.006
Standard deviation 0.003
Observed vulnerability density 0.070
Obviously, the prediction is not very accurate, but the distribution shifts
in the correct direction as the mean of the distribution used for the vulnera-
bility density is 0.0054. This effect is similar as in the CM1 case in section 4.2.
The model cannot completely overcome deficiencies in the underlying distri-
butions for the indicators.
25
Windows and Linux have 15–40 MSLOC, i.e., the are an order of mag-
nitude larger than Tomcat. Hence, one explanation of the large difference
could be that the used underlying distribution for the vulnerability is wrong
and need to be improved with data from systems with other sizes. Another
possibility is that the system size is a fact that needs to be considered. In
this case, it seems that smaller systems have a higher vulnerability density.
This could be explained by the fact that in Tomcat almost all parts of the
system are exposed to external access. Therefore, the fact Size of Software
might be introduced as an additional factor. However, experimenting with
this additional fact showed that it cannot reach accurate prediction as it is
still constrained by the vulnerability density distribution.
The large difference can also mean that our chosen metric vulnerability
density is not suitable as it seems to be strongly dependent on the system
size, type, or both. Hence, more advanced metrics such as breach rates or
cost to breach [20] should be used. These measures are, however, significantly
harder to measure.
4.4. Discussion
The foremost goal of these examples was not to show predictive validity
but to investigate the general feasibility of the assessment and prediction
approach. Nevertheless, in two of the maintainability cases, we were able
to come to accurate predictions although we had little knowledge about the
actual system. Furthermore, we saw that it is possible to build a Bayesian
model with reasonable effort. The four-step approach gives direct guidance
for most of the network building. However, setting up the NPTs is still
a challenge. There are usually several possibilities how a relationship can
be expressed and with how much uncertainty it should be afflicted. This
needs expert opinion and experimentation. Nevertheless, AgenaRisk provides
sophisticated tool support to find easier ways to define an NPT.
Another problem encountered in the analysed cases was to find a reason-
able empirical data basis for the distribution of the indicators. For the facts
and activities, it is sufficient to employ rather coarse-grained ranked states
and the good tool support helps in defining corresponding distributions. For
the indicators, a good data basis or distributions from the literature are
crucial.
As our ABQMs can get very large with a few hundreds of model elements,
it remains to be evaluated whether the approach scales when the quality
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model is fully mapped to a Bayesian network. Probably a selection of a
subset of the quality model is necessary first.
Furthermore, it is important to note that a more in-depth validation of
a resulting Bayesian network is necessary in order to ensure that all parts
– topology, node states, and NPTs – represent the interdependencies of the
quality factors good enough so that a valid statement about the quality of
the software system can be made. This is not covered by these examples but
has to be the next step.
The usage of the proposed approach, however, has benefits beyond as-
sessing a quality goal. If we are able to calibrate the model and establish
sufficient accuracy in the Bayesian network, we will be able to calculate low
level goals for quality goals. For example, we can infer requirements for the
indicators of the maintainability cases for a given goal for the average change
effort. A required average change effort of only 10 person-hours has the most
likely explanation in a comment ratio of 0.3, an average cyclomatic complex-
ity of 6.4, and an average module size of 64 LOC. This can be used to guide
development. Finally, also requirements specification is supported by this
approach as quality requirements now can use the given indicators to specify
assessable requirements.
5. Related Work
The basic idea to use Bayesian networks for assessing and predicting soft-
ware quality has been developed foremost by Fenton, Neil, and Littlewood.
They introduced Bayesian networks as a tool in this area and applied it in
various contexts related to software quality. In [21] they formulate a critique
on current defect prediction models and suggest to use Bayesian networks.
Other researchers also used Bayesian networks for software quality prediction
similarly [22, 23]
The work closest to the approach proposed in this paper is [24]. The
authors discuss quality models such as the ISO 9126 [2] and their problems
such as the undefinedness of the relationships in such a model. They aim at
solving these problems by defining Bayesian networks for quality attributes
directly. Our work differentiates in using a defined structure for quality mod-
els that contain far more details as common quality models. This structure
and detail allows a straightforward derivation of a Bayesian network from
the quality model. This has the advantage that the basic quality model can
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also be used for other purposes then prediction such as the specification of
quality requirements.
Beaver, Schiavone, and Berrios [25] also used a Bayesian network to pre-
dict software quality including diverse factors such as team skill and process
maturity. In his thesis [26], Beaver even compared the approach to neural
networks and Least Squares regressions that both were outperformed by the
Bayesian network. However, they did not rely on a structured quality model
as in our approach.
An earlier version of this paper was published in [27]. It already con-
tained the 4-step approach as described in this paper. However, we added 3
additional projects to the maintainability case and a completely new security
case in order to validate the applicability of the approach more broadly.
6. Conclusions
A high goal in software quality management is the reliable quantitative
assessment and prediction of software quality. Many efforts in building as-
sessment and prediction models have given insights in the usefulness but also
the constraints of such models. However, these models have not been tightly
integrated into other quality management activities. Activity-based quality
models have proven in practice to be a solid foundation for defining quality
on a detailed level. However, quantitative analyses have not been directly
possible so far.
Bayesian networks have been shown to provide promising results in qual-
ity predictions. Because of that and their clear structuring that can straight-
forwardly reflect the structure of activity-based quality models, a four-step
approach for transferring activity-based quality models to Bayesian networks
was proposed. It allows to systematically construct a Bayesian network that
uses the knowledge encoded in the quality model to provide information
about a given assessment or prediction goal. In the terminology of [28],
we use a quality definition model (the ABQM) and enrich it with a quality
assessment and quality prediction model (the Bayesian Network).
Although not fully validated, we demonstrated the approach in a study
using real NASA project data and automatically measured bug patterns of
the Tomcat servlet container. The examples showed the applicability of the
approach to such projects and could improve the prediction in comparison to
industry standard values. For 2 of the 5 cases, the predictions were accurate
despite the usage of literature values as basis for the distributions only.
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The use of Bayesian networks opens many possibilities. Most interest-
ingly, after building a large Bayesian network, a sensitivity analysis of that
network can be performed. This can answer the practically very relevant
question which of the factors are the most important ones. It would allow to
reduce the measurement efforts significantly by concentrating on these most
influential facts.
We plan to apply this approach in future case studies at our industrial
partners in order to further validate the approach. A comprehensive analysis
of the predictive validity is necessary to judge the usefulness of the approach
and to compare it with other means for assessment and prediction.
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